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Felon disenfranchisement laws do not just disenfranchise.  They also con-
fuse.  By imposing heavy penalties for failing to correctly navigate complex 
provisions, these statutes confuse eligible voters and discourage them from ex-
ercising their right to vote.  In this way, felon disenfranchisement laws resem-
ble modern voter suppression laws: they deter eligible voters from voting.  
Modest reforms can and should be implemented to affirmatively inform for-
merly incarcerated individuals of their restored voting rights.   
  
* J.D., Stanford Law School 2016; Ph.D. Candidate, Stanford Political Science Depart-
ment.  I worked as a Skadden Fellow for the Voting Rights Project of the ACLU from 
2017–19 and draw on some of my experiences there.  I am grateful for the opportunity 
to have seen some of the problems of voter confusion up close and privileged to have 
worked with colleagues and voting rights advocates who litigated some of the cases I 
cite in this paper.  But nothing in this article should be construed as representing the 
views of the ACLU or the Voting Rights Project.   
 
I would like to thank Jennifer Selin and the student organizers of the symposium for 
their generous hospitality in Columbia, the other panelists for excellent comments, and 
my editors – Emily Holtzman, Michael Essma, and George Brand – for thorough edits 
and useful suggestions.  All errors are my own.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern voter suppression efforts have given special force – and sinister 
undertone – to the old political adage of “if you can’t convince them, confuse 
them.”1  This tactic applies not only to the content of policy proposals and can-
didate positions but also to the nuts and bolts of election laws themselves: who 
can vote, when to vote, where to vote, how to vote, and what is needed to vote.  
Voter suppression laws include those imposing identification or proof of eligi-
bility requirements for voting as well as those restricting opportunities to vote 
and to register to vote.  In addition to directly disenfranchising otherwise eligi-
ble voters, many of these laws also suppress the vote by imposing severe infor-
mation costs.  Put simply, disenfranchisement through confusion has become 
a distinct feature of modern voter suppression and should be addressed.  
Felon disenfranchisement laws – while long pre-dating the post-Shelby 
County v. Holder wave of voter suppression laws2 – also contain this same 
feature.  Indeed, given the complexity of many felon disenfranchisement re-
gimes, especially when and how voting rights are restored, disenfranchisement 
can also operate through confusion.  In this way, felon disenfranchisement 
straddles the world of first and second generation voter disenfranchisement.3  
As a remnant of the first generation, some felon disenfranchisement laws still 
directly, cruelly, and widely disenfranchise a significant segment of the popu-
lation.  But, as many of these laws take root and adapt to life in the second 
generation world, they have also acquired a voter suppressive effect derived 
from confusion.  And so, felon disenfranchisement laws today combine two 
distinct strategies: disenfranchise a lot of people and make many others unsure 
about whether they are disenfranchised. 
This Article first describes these two strategies and then focuses on the 
second generation tactics.  It explains the similarities between the voter confu-
sion costs of modern voter suppression and those of felon disenfranchisement.  
These similarities derive largely from the complexity of compliance.  In the 
felon disenfranchisement context, such complexity is compounded by the fact 
that it has two temporal stages: when voting rights are taken away and when 
they are given back.  Moreover, not only are felon disenfranchisement laws 
potentially more confusing than modern voter suppression laws, they also 
  
 1. This apocryphal quote is often incorrectly attributed to Harry Truman.  Alt-
hough he did quote it, he did not coin it. See Garson O’Toole, If You Can’t Convince 
Them, Confuse Them, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Dec. 2, 2013), https://quoteinvestiga-
tor.com/2013/12/02/confuse-them/ [perma.cc/P6S7-37DD].  
 2. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).  These laws are described infra 
note 7. 
 3. I differentiate between first- and second-generation voter suppression strate-
gies for ease of contrast between the time periods in which the strategies were opera-
tional, and also in the kinds of laws that were enacted to implement them.  For ease of 
reference, they can be thought of broadly as the delineation between Parts I and II of 
ALEX KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (2000). 
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inspire – and warrant – more risk aversion in voting.  For affected voters, mis-
taking whether one is in fact eligible to vote risks committing a crime, the very 
reason these voters were subject to felon disenfranchisement laws in the first 
place.  Finally, this Article suggests reforms for doctrine and policy to reduce 
voter confusion in felon disenfranchisement laws. 
I.  NEW TRICKS 
In the post-Shelby County era,4 first-generation voter disenfranchisement 
meets second-generation voter suppression.  Distinguishing between the two 
generations not only helps demarcate the eras in which these strategies were 
operational, but also helps to identify the features and strategies of voter sup-
pression borne of the two different eras.  It is the combination of first- and 
second-generation aspects of felon disenfranchisement law that produces a 
voter suppression strategy that is more than the sum of its parts.  No voter sup-
pression law is more first-generation than that disenfranchising felons.5  Felon 
disenfranchisement is one of the original sins of our democracy, outlasting its 
peers such as literacy tests and poll taxes.6  In the modern era, it blushes with 
anachronism: no other law so outrightly, widely, and shamelessly disenfran-
chises so many people. 
Despite its age, felon disenfranchisement is a pivotal tool in modern voter 
suppression as well.7  What never went away as a first-generation strategy of 
disenfranchisement has now acquired the undesirable characteristics of its sec-
ond-generation peers as well.  And it is its place among the second-generation 
voter suppression strategies that I focus on in this Article.  As reforms slowly 
  
 4. In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court effectively ended the pre-clear-
ance regime under the Voting Rights Act, which required certain jurisdictions with his-
tories of racial discrimination in voting to subject changes in voting laws to approval 
from the Department of Justice before they could be implemented.  570 U.S. at 556–
57.  Many states responded to the decision by passing voter suppression laws, some of 
which are discussed in further detail in this article. See also The Effects of Shelby 
County v. Holder, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.brennan-
center.org/analysis/effects-shelby-county-v-holder [perma.cc/E6FT-ZTNJ]. 
 5. For a history of felon disenfranchisement laws, see ALEX KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT 
TO VOTE, 50–51 (2000); JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006). 
 6. Avi Brisman, Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values: 
Liberalizing Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 283, 333–34 (2007) (quoting Andrew L. Shapiro, Chal-
lenging Criminal Disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 
103 YALE L.J. 537, 538 (1993)). 
 7. I describe modern voter suppression laws as second-generation laws for ease 
of comparison to the first generation variety.  To connect the concept of second-gener-
ation voter suppression with the literature, it is synonymous with what Dan Tokaji de-
scribes as the “New Vote Denial.” Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial in Applying 
Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2015). 
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erode outright bans on voting for large swathes of the population, felon disen-
franchisement laws increasingly suppress voting by confusing eligible voters.  
This confusion has special force in the low information environments that vot-
ers who are implicated by felon disenfranchisement laws inhabit. 
In order to better understand the specific aspects of felon disenfranchise-
ment laws that suppress – and deter – voting through confusion, this section 
surveys how second-generation voter suppression laws employ confusion.  
Then, the following section identifies those elements and strategies of confu-
sion in felon disenfranchisement laws. 
A.  Confusion from Complexity 
Many of felon disenfranchisement’s modern peers derive their voter sup-
pression effects from confusion over how to properly comply with require-
ments for voting.  Lacking the political cover to implement outright restrictions 
on the franchise or the legal cover to explicitly target racial minorities, modern 
voter suppression relies, in part, on confusing voters about what it takes to 
vote.8  To be sure, these laws are often focused on disenfranchising individuals 
who cannot meet the implemented requirements (e.g., not possessing photo ID 
or inability to vote except during the early voting period).  But confusion helps 
extend the voter suppressive effects beyond individuals facially affected by the 
law.   
Complexity engenders confusion.  Voter ID laws demonstrate this well. 
What constitutes and – more importantly – what does not constitute acceptable 
ID for purposes of voting can be confusing and unexpected.  Take, for example, 
the voter ID law that Wisconsin implemented in the wake of Shelby County v. 
Holder.9  The law considers military IDs to be acceptable but not Veteran IDs.10  
Student IDs from accredited Wisconsin universities or colleges are acceptable 
while those from Wisconsin’s sixteen two-year technical colleges are not.11  
Students must additionally proffer a document “showing that he or she is cur-
rently enrolled.”12  Even the basic question of when a photo ID is required to 
vote is not easily answered by the law.  For example, some – but not all – mail-
in absentee voters must provide ID, even though election administrators cannot 
match the voter casting the ballot to an ID photo for any mail-in ballots.13 
  
 8. See Danielle Root & Adam Barclay, Voter Suppression During the 2018 Mid-
term Elections, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.americanpro-
gress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/11/20/461296/voter-suppression-2018-mid-
term-elections/ [perma.cc/M4P2-NEW7].  
 9. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (order denying 
stay of permanent injunction pending appeal of the Wisconsin ID law, codified as 
amended in scattered sections of chapters 5 and 6 of the Wisconsin statutes). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 844. 
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Kansas’s Documentary Proof of Citizenship (“DPOC”) Law demon-
strates the same problem of voter confusion.14  In 2011, Kansas passed a law 
requiring all prospective voter registrants to submit documentary proof of citi-
zenship.15  The district court described the process of registering to vote under 
the new regime at the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) as “burden-
some, confusing and inconsistently enforced.”16  For example, two of the plain-
tiffs in the case were asked whether they wished to register to vote at the DMV.  
Since they answered in the affirmative, they believed they had properly been 
registered to vote.17  However, because they lacked DPOC, these plaintiffs 
were never actually registered.18  Indeed, the plaintiffs’ confusion was matched 
by that of election workers: one of the plaintiffs returned to the DMV to provide 
his DPOC, only to be told he was already registered to vote when, in fact, he 
was not.19  The confusion was further compounded by the fact that Kansas did 
not consistently provide notice to individuals who failed to provide DPOC that 
they must do so if they desired to vote.20  
These examples demonstrate that the voter suppression effects of any 
given law cannot simply be measured by the number of individuals it disen-
franchises on its face.  For instance, the suppressive effect of Wisconsin’s voter 
ID law extends far beyond the number of individuals without valid ID or with 
ID that is expired for purposes of voting.21  Voter suppression also derives from 
the complexity of the legal regime for voting.  When the State constructs a 
complex legal landscape that voters must be informed about and then correctly 
navigate, it puts pressure on the ability and confidence of voters to get the law 
right.  When such cognitive demands are severe, either because of sheer com-
plexity or lack of reasoning that voters can intuit, voter confusion is virtually 
guaranteed.  
B.  Confusion Over Safeguards Diminishes Their Value 
The strategy of using complexity to induce confusion and hence uncer-
tainty about voter eligibility is especially obvious when considering the safe-
guards provided supposedly to help voters.  With voter ID laws, permitting IDs 
to be used past expiration might be considered a safeguard – except that the 
rules governing expired IDs are often confusing.  Consider, for instance, how 
  
 14. Fish v. Kobach, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1134 (D. Kan. 2016).  The court en-
joined the law and it remains enjoined while the case is on appeal. 
 15. Id. at 1115–16.  For most voters, DPOC is a birth certificate, passport, or nat-
uralization certificate. 
 16. Id. at 1134. 
 17. Id. at 1135.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1136. 
 21. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 852 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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long each kind of voter ID could be used post expiration in Wisconsin.22  Most 
IDs are not valid if they expired after the most recent general election, even 
though a passport or a driver’s license from more than two years ago can serve 
as valid verification of an individual’s identification – the general features of 
one’s face, name, gender and date of birth rarely change significantly over 
time.23  Naturalization certificates, which do not themselves expire, are given 
an artificial expiration date for voter ID purposes.24  
Yet in contrast to the Texas voter ID law, which bars all use of IDs expir-
ing sixty days before the date of presentation at the polls,25 the Wisconsin voter 
ID law might appear comparatively virtuous as it permits some expired IDs to 
be used for voting.26  On paper, at least, there are some expired IDs that can be 
used for voting in Wisconsin and not in Texas.27  But the patchwork of expira-
tion dates mapped onto various IDs demonstrates how confusion can diminish 
the beneficial effects of these safeguards. 
Provisions in identification laws that allow voters who do not already pos-
sess the requisite identification to obtain it for free or seek an exemption per-
haps demonstrate this principle even more clearly.  Even the harshest second-
generation laws – those that veer closest to first-generation restrictions – have 
had to include in their terms provisions for eligible voters who cannot comply 
with the law.28  The Voter ID laws address gaps in ID possession with the pro-
vision of supposedly free identification for purposes of voting.  But how to 
actually obtain a free ID is far from clear.  In evaluating the Wisconsin voter 
ID law, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin painstak-
ingly detailed the procedural hoops low-income voters who lack ID must jump 
through in order to obtain a free state ID issued by the DMV.29  Often, the 
documentation required to obtain a free state ID itself necessitates an additional 
frustrating and opaque administrative process.30  But that process begins only 
if a voter even gets that far.  On the website the state of Wisconsin runs, pur-
portedly to educate voters about the law, the link to “If you do not have one of 
these photo IDs, learn how to get a free state ID card”31 leads to a non-existent 
YouTube video.  With respect to the Texas voter ID law, a voter without photo 
ID may obtain an election identification certificate from the Department of 
Public Safety, but in order to obtain such a certificate, a voter must present the 
same underlying documents she would have had to produce in order to obtain 
  
 22. Id. at 843.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 641 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 26. Frank, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 843. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 844.  
 29. Id. at 855–61.  
 30. Id. at 858.  
 31. Do I Have the Right Photo ID?, BRING IT TO THE BALLOT, (last visited Sep. 3, 
2019) https://bringit.wi.gov/do-i-have-right-photo-id [perma.cc/3MWN-B3DD]. 
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a photo ID.32  As for the Kansas DPOC law, while the statute provided a “safety 
net” to voters who do not possess DPOC, the bureaucratic morass and opacity 
of the process meant that “only three Kansas citizens have availed themselves 
of this procedure in the more than three years that the statute ha[d] been in 
effect.”33 
The complexity of the supposed safeguards explains why litigants chal-
lenging these laws have favored an alternative safeguard: providing voters with 
an opportunity to affirm their identity or eligibility under pain of perjury.34  The 
requirement functions as a strong deterrent against falsifying one’s identity 
while being straightforward enough for eligible voters to comply with and elec-
tion workers to administer.35  It also does not demand that voters be well versed 
or well informed about how to comply with such laws in advance.  Instead, it 
enables all voters, whether conversant in the laws or not, to register to vote if 
they are eligible and cast a ballot if they are registered.36  It is telling when 
states insist on administering complex safeguards in place of a simple but pow-
erful affirmation requirement.  Perhaps the complexity and the ensuing confu-
sion it causes is not merely incidental but crucial to the regime. 
C.  Federalism Magnifies Confusion 
Moreover, our system of federalism, in which voter requirements are de-
termined on a state-by-state basis, magnifies the potential for voter confusion 
about what is actually required for voting in one’s own state.37  Voters might 
simply expect the worst given the scraps of information they receive about vot-
ing laws across the country.  The national pervasiveness of second-generation 
voter restrictions might magnify voters’ confusion about the state-specific re-
quirements that govern them when they go to the polls.  Cross-border voter 
confusion has been captured by surveys.  For instance, in a nationwide survey 
of registered voters, Dr. Charles Stewart found that many voters in states with-
out voter ID laws answered that they were required to show ID in order to 
vote.38  Similar confusion has also been observed anecdotally.  When I did 
voter protection work in the 2018 general elections, voters routinely ap-
proached me to ask whether they needed to present an ID in order to vote, and 
if so, what would be necessary.  Others kept the registration card from when 
  
 32. Veasey, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 653. 
 33. Fish v. Kobach, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1137 (D. Kan. 2016). 
 34. Id.  
 35. The evidence in the Kansas DPOC case supports this.  Id. at 1138.  Very few 
noncitizens successfully registered to vote under a pure attestation regime in Kansas 
prior to the introduction of the DPOC law.  Id.    
 36. Id.  
 37. Martha Guarnieri, Civil Rebirth: Making the Case for Automatic Ex-Felon 
Voter Restoration, 89 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 481 (2017). 
 38. Charles Stewart III, Voter ID: Who Has Them? Who Shows Them?, 66 OKLA. 
L. REV. 21, 48 (2013). 
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they registered to vote, thinking it was necessary in order to verify their regis-
tration before voting.  But I was in New Mexico, a state that did not and does 
not have a general voter ID requirement.39 
What do all of these sources and elements of confusion add up to?  When 
one’s ability to comply with voting laws is not clear ex ante, why try?  These 
questions reflect the voter suppression aspect of confusion – to make it so that 
eligible voters do not vote.  Moreover, confusion afflicts not only voters but 
also line-level election administrators.40  They may unevenly apply voting laws 
that are less than clear.  When the carve-outs, safeguards, and details for voting 
requirements are hard to understand, the large corps of election administrators, 
most of whom work on a volunteer basis, may have difficulty correctly admin-
istering the law.41  And especially when busy, they may be inclined to turn 
away individuals with questionable abilities to comply with the law in favor of 
those they are sure can vote.42 
II.  THIS OLD DOG 
The aforementioned harms of second-generation voter suppression apply 
a fortiori to felon disenfranchisement.  Felon disenfranchisement regimes are, 
if anything, more complex.  This next section details the aspects of complexity 
in felon disenfranchisement regimes, and the voter suppressive – if not voter 
intimidation – effects of these laws. 
A.  Confusion a fortiori  
Many aspects of felon disenfranchisement regimes are confusing.  For 
instance, whether a criminal conviction leads to disenfranchisement can be a 
complex legal question.  This is especially true for states that differentiate dis-
enfranchisement between parole and probation, the boundaries of which may 
have technical significance for the state but are not clear to individuals subject 
to their limitations.43  Risk of confusion can also be especially strong in states 
  
 39. Voting and Elections, N.M. SECRETARY OF ST., 
https://www.sos.state.nm.us/voting-and-elections/voting-faqs/voting/ 
[perma.cc/6CXF-R23V].  The state does require voters registering for the first time by 
mail to present identification when voting, but this pertains to a very small percentage 
of the voting population. Id.  
 40. Understanding Election Administration & Voting, DEMOCRACY FUND 4 
(2017) https://www.democracyfund.org/media/uploaded/Elections-Sum-
mary_2017aug31.pdf [perma.cc/22ND-G9DQ]. 
 41. Id. at 8.  
 42. Id. at 5.  
 43. For a full list of states in this category, see Felony Disenfranchisement Laws 
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that prolong disenfranchisement post-sentence, especially if disenfranchise-
ment is contingent on the type of offense.44  While individuals may have 
knowledge of the facts underlying their offense, the classification of their of-
fense may not be straightforward. 
Where felon disenfranchisement laws are especially confusing relates to 
two important temporal questions: when rights are taken away and when they 
are restored.  To be sure, this confusion does not apply in states with lifetime 
bans on individuals with criminal convictions.45  But confusion presents a chal-
lenge for voters attempting to comply with laws in many other states.  The 
insight from Jeremy Travis’s book on re-entry after incarceration, apparent 
from its title But They All Come Back, applies with full force to voting rights 
restoration after initial disenfranchisement.46  Except in states implementing 
lifetime disenfranchisement, most individuals with a criminal record will, at 
some point, be given the right to vote back.  When disenfranchisement ceases 
is murky.  A particularly vicious but hidden barrier is the requirement that in-
dividuals not only serve their sentences, but that they satisfy all legal financial 
obligations (“LFOs”) as well.  A majority of states require this, whether by 
statute or through practice.47  Research indicates that this requirement can pre-
sent a high barrier for individuals;48 a study conducted in Alabama suggests 
that the median amount owed is almost $4,000.49  Moreover, whether one owes 
LFOs and how much can be hard to figure out.50  That the Florida legislature 
passed a law requiring all LFOs to be fulfilled before voting rights can be re-
stored on the heels of the passage of Amendment 4,51 which largely repealed 
  
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.  States with lifetime bans on individuals with criminal convictions include: 
Florida prior to the adoption of Amendment 4; Virginia prior to the governor’s rights 
restoration order; Iowa; and Kentucky. Id. 
 46. See generally JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE 
CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY (Jeffrey Butts et al., eds. 2005). 
 47. Allyson Fredrickson & Linnea Lassiter, Disenfranchised by Debt: Millions 
Impoverished by Prison, Blocked from Voting, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. SOC’Y 5 (March 
2016) http://allianceforajustsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Disenfranchised-
by-Debt-FINAL-3.8.pdf [perma.cc/ZRK6-F44L]. 
 48. While the extent of LFOs are not well understood or estimated by scholars for 
data availability reasons, scholars have taken LFOs seriously.  LFOs constitute an ac-
tive area of research.  Their significant anticipated effects are evident from the fact that 
they are more widespread than any other method of criminal punishment. See generally 
Karin D. Martin, et al., Monetary Sanction: Legal Financial Obligations in U.S. Sys-
tems of Justice, 1 ANN. REV. OF CRIMINOLOGY 471 (2018). 
 49. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The 
Case of Legal Financial Obligations, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 311 (2017). 
 50. Rebekah Diller, The Hidden Cost of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 6–7 (Mar. 2016) https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/de-
fault/files/legacy/Justice/FloridaF&F.pdf [perma.cc/3FJX-WGCK]. 
 51. Patricia Mazzei, Floridians Gave Ex-Felons the Right to Vote. Lawmakers Just 
Put a Big Obstacle in Their Way, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2019) 
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Florida’s lifetime ban, provides some hint of what legislators believe to be the 
requirement’s suppressive effect. 
Even lifetime ban states provide methods of rights restoration on paper.52  
But achieving rights restoration given the complexity of these procedures is not 
realistic.  In Virginia, for instance, one of the first acts of the Governor’s office 
in attempting to address the severity of the State’s lifetime disenfranchisement 
ban was to relax requirements for rights restoration.53  These efforts included 
streamlining the thirteen-page application down to a single page for some ap-
plicants, reducing the waiting period, and removing the requirement that indi-
viduals fulfill all court costs.54  Former Governor McAuliffe restored the rights 
of more individuals than of those under the past seven governors combined, 
which demonstrates just how high the barriers presented for individuals seek-
ing rights restoration were.55  The complexity and burdensomeness of the rights 
restoration process, like safeguards for individuals not possessing voter ID, can 
negate any utility of their existence.56 
The complexity of disenfranchising and re-enfranchising conditions re-
quires voters to apply a complicated set of facts to a confusing set of laws.  In 
other words, they are asked to act like lawyers.  This puts an immense burden 




 52. See, e.g., infra notes 53 and 56. 
 53. News Release, Governor McAuliffe Restores Voting and Civil Rights to Over 
200,000 Virginians, (Apr. 22, 2016) https://www.governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/all-
releases/2017/mcauliffe-administration/headline-826610-en.html [perma.cc/E335-
G99C]; see also Restoration of Rights: Policy Updates and Timeline, SEC. OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH, https://www.restore.virginia.gov/policy-updates-and-timeline/ 
[perma.cc/3RDM-XF6T] (last visited Sept. 25, 2019). 
 54. News Release, supra note 53. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1292 (N.D. Fla. 2018).  Florida’s 
regime is an extreme example of this. Id.  Its rights restoration regime was as first gen-
eration as its lifetime ban.  Id.  Instead of using confusion, the law simply made it 
virtually impossible for voting rights to be restored following a criminal conviction.  Id.  
The rights restoration process was the target of the lawsuit in Hand v. Scott, and its 
harshness is described in the district court’s opinion granting summary judgment to 
plaintiffs.  Id.  In order to even apply for clemency before the Board, an individual must 
first wait either five or seven years after completion of their sentence and fulfillment of 
any fines and fees.  Id. at 1293.  The applications then go before the Florida Commis-
sion on Offender Review, which provides a non-binding recommendation to the Board.  
Id.  The Board is entirely unrestrained in substance or procedure as to how to make 
their decisions.  Id. at 1294.  For instance, there are no time limits at all on when the 
Board must act on any application. Id. at 1304.  The actual number of individuals whose 
rights were stored under this regime is sufficient evidence of the difficulty of the rights 
restoration process and the slim likelihood of success: in the seven years since 2011, 
less than 3,000 individuals in a lifetime disenfranchisement state received restoration. 
Id. at 1301. 
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they are eligible to vote but also to be competent in applying those requirements 
to their own distinctive situations.  How well voters will navigate this process 
depends on their access to both factual and legal information, their appetite for 
risk, and their desire to vote.  As with second generation voter suppression 
laws, the variety and ubiquity of felon disenfranchisement regimes across states 
can similarly lead to false and risk-averse assumptions that the regime is 
harsher than it actually is.  Given the many legal and practical difficulties pre-
sented by life after incarceration, formerly incarcerated individuals might ex-
pect the worst of legal policies, including those governing if and when voting 
rights are restored.  In addition, as other observers have already noted, confu-
sion on the part of election administrators also contributes to the de facto dis-
enfranchisement of so many individuals with criminal convictions.57 
None of the confusion caused by felon disenfranchisement laws serve any 
legitimate state purpose, separate and apart from any purpose that might be 
served by felon disenfranchisement itself.58  As Professor Pam Karlan has 
demonstrated, disenfranchising individuals with former criminal convictions 
only conceivably serves a punitive purpose.59  And the only purpose of confu-
sion over whether one is actually disenfranchised is to deter the exercise of that 
right.  No valid criminal justice objective justifies making compliance with 
felon disenfranchisement laws difficult or taxing.60 
B.  It Bites 
Felon disenfranchisement’s layering of the second-generation strategy of 
confusion onto an already draconian regime not only fails to serve any legiti-
mate state purposes but also produces especially pernicious effects and unique 
harms.  These harms harken back to the roots of felon disenfranchisement in 
the first generation era through intimidation and threat of punishment.  For all 
their evils, second-generation voter suppression strategies are satisfied with ex-
cluding eligible voters from the ballot.  Confusion over whether a particular ID 
is valid for purposes of voting, at worst, results in the denial of one’s right to 
vote.  Though that is a harm to take seriously, it pales in comparison to the risk 
of illegally voting as a former convicted felon.  A confusing felon disenfran-
chisement regime elevates the risk of voter suppression for two reasons: the 
vulnerability of the population affected and the political nature of prosecutions 
for felon voting.  By definition, individuals implicated by felon disenfranchise-
ment statutes have already been through the criminal legal system.  As a result, 
  
 57. Ericka Wood & Rachel Bloom, De Facto Disenfranchisement, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. 1 (2008) https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publica-
tions/09.08.DeFacto.Disenfranchisement.pdf [perma.cc/B776-UN8F]. 
 58. See Pam Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and 
the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1149–55 (2004). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
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risk aversion is likely very high.  Access and appetite to seek out information 
are also likely poor given the many challenges of re-entry.61 
The risk that even unintentional illegal voting could lead to criminal con-
viction is no mere abstraction.  Prosecutors have exercised their discretion to 
pursue individuals who illegally voted, even when the facts clearly indicated 
that those individuals did so without any intent to commit a crime.62  This hap-
pened to twelve voters in Alamance County in North Carolina.63  While a 
statewide audit discovered that 441 individuals had voted improperly in the 
2016 elections under the State’s felon disenfranchisement regime, only the 
prosecutor from Alamance County decided to pursue these cases criminally.64  
In Iowa, two individuals who were encouraged by precinct workers to cast pro-
visional ballots were charged with felony election misconduct charges.65  In 
Texas, an individual received a five-year prison sentence for illegal voting.66  
Even when prosecutors are not inclined to prosecute, highly motivated mem-
bers of the public have made use of publicly available criminal justice and voter 
files to implicate individuals and put pressure on prosecutors to bring charges.67  
In many of these instances, the implicated individuals were confused about 
whether being on probation, parole, or supervised release disqualified them 
from voting. 
These high-profile instances of prosecution are sobering.  Mr. Frank 
Swanger, one of the individuals prosecuted in Iowa, succinctly encapsulated 
the lesson he learned: “You try to do the right thing, and then you’re penalized.  
Even if I get a chance to have my [voting] rights restored, I will never vote 
again.  No.”68  Mr. Taranta Holman, prosecuted in North Carolina, expressed 
  
 61. See generally, TRAVIS, supra note 46. 
 62. Sam Levine, They Didn’t Know They Were Ineligible to Vote. A Prosecutor 
Went After Them Anyway, HUFFPOST (Aug. 13, 2018) https://www.huffpost.com/en-
try/almance-county-felon-voting_n_5n714d8e4b0530743cca87d [perma.cc/R9QH-
CXPK]. 
 63. Jack Healy, Arrested, Jailed and Charged with a Felony. For Voting, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/us/arrested-voting-north-
carolina.html [perma.cc/ZM9N-WE67]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Jason Clayworth, Dozens of Felons Have Been Caught Illegally Voting in 




 66. Vanessa Romo & Sasha Ingbern, Texas Woman Sentenced to 5 Years for Ille-
gal Voting, NPR (Mar. 31, 2018) https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2018/03/31/598458914/texas-woman-sentenced-to-5-years-for-illegal-vot-
ing?t=1559499591522 [perma.cc/5762-G8WT]. 
 67. Dan Christensen, Were 275 Votes Cast by Florida Felons Illegally? Miami-
Dade Prosecutors Investigate, MIAMI HERALD, (Aug. 14, 2018) https://www.miami-
herald.com/news/politics-government/article216694645.html. 
 68. Clayworth, supra note 65. 
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the identical sentiment: “Even when I get this cleared up, I still won’t vote. 
That’s too much of a risk.”69  This is not only a message felt by the individuals 
targeted but also one that, when publicized, deters other potential voters with 
criminal convictions from voting.  The public nature of these prosecutions, 
coupled with the particular sensitivities of the intended audience of similarly 
situated voters, produces a climate of fear and deterrence and reminds us all 
that while felon disenfranchisement has adapted to a second-generation world, 
it has not forgotten its first-generation roots. 
III.  TAMING THE BEAST 
How might doctrine and policy better take the costs of confusion seriously 
in the context of felon disenfranchisement?  Mitigating the most pernicious 
aspects of confusion about felon disenfranchisement is relatively straightfor-
ward.  But the broader question of how doctrine and policy might account for 
the costs of confusion is much more uncertain. 
A.  Muzzle 
Preventing the prosecution of unintentional illegal voting by individuals 
with former criminal convictions is legally straightforward, if not politically 
feasible.  Illegal voting statutes should be rewritten to require that the defend-
ant, if ineligible to vote due to a criminal conviction, has specific intent to vote 
illegally.  In other words, prosecutors should have to prove that individuals 
who illegally voted due to a criminal conviction knew that their criminal con-
viction rendered them ineligible to vote and voted anyway. 
Such a requirement, while not ubiquitous in criminal law, has a long his-
tory in federal criminal tax law.  In Cheek v. United States, Justice Byron White 
detailed the reasoning and historical development behind the specific intent re-
quirement.70  The “complexity of the tax laws” warranted a departure from the 
general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to crim-
inal prosecution.71  Such a departure was executed both by Congress in drafting 
and by the Court in interpreting those statutes as requiring specific intent to 
violate them.72  As the Court clarified through a series of cases, violation of 
federal criminal statutes that Congress required to be “willful” occurs when a 
defendant commits a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.”73 
As the prior section of this Article detailed, felon disenfranchisement laws 
can be dizzyingly complex.74  The rationale giving rise to the specific intent 
  
 69. Healy, supra note 63. 
 70. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991). 
 71. Id. at 199. 
 72. Id. at 200.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See supra Part II. 
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requirement in federal criminal tax laws applies with equal force to requiring 
the same in felon illegal voting statutes.  Legal complexity over what leads to 
disenfranchisement (and re-enfranchisement) is severe and gives rise to “bona 
fide misunderstandings” as to whether one is prohibited from voting.75  Prose-
cutorial overreach of accidental illegal voting would be precluded by an ex-
plicit statutory requirement of specific intent.  Stopping short of that, legisla-
tures can revise statutes to explicitly permit mistake of law defenses in illegal 
voting cases.  Depending on the kind of felon disenfranchisement statute in the 
state, the legislature could craft tailored mistake of law defenses relating to 
predictable and understandable factual and legal mistakes.  
B.  And Then? 
The broader question of how doctrine might take confusion into account  
is much more elusive.  Traditionally, confusion is rarely a stand-alone claim in 
voting rights litigation.  Unlike in the trademark context in which confusion (of 
consumers) relates to the actual injury claimed, confusion (of voters) is rarely 
itself the claim in voting rights litigation, although litigants challenging con-
fusing statutes often plead and prove facts related to confusion to present a 
holistic picture of the harms caused by the law.76  
Specifically, in litigation challenging felon disenfranchisement, the legal 
claims rarely address the confusion injuries produced by these statutes.77  The 
legal claim most appropriate for addressing confusion is constitutional vague-
ness.  Such a claim would allege that a criminal voting statute is too vague to 
provide “fair warning” to voters of what the law prohibits and hence is 
  
 75. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933). 
 76. The relatively holistic framework for Anderson/Burdick challenges theoreti-
cally allows litigants to allege voter confusion as a burden on the right to vote.  Brief 
of Professor Erwin Chemerinsky as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6–9, 
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25).  But 
the case law has not developed such that voter confusion can be brought as a distinct 
and certainly not as a standalone basis for an Anderson/Burdick challenge.  Id. 
 77. Traditionally, challenges to felon disenfranchisement statutes have in large 
part focused on the racial impact of these laws.  See Johnson v. Gov. of Fla., 405 F.3d 
1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2005); Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).  
Racial claims can hardly be used to address confusion harms, as it is implausible that 
there are significant racial differences in confusion. See Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1218.  
Further, challenges to LFO requirements in felon disenfranchisement statutes are typi-
cally that they constitute poll taxes or discriminate based on poverty, but neither claim 
goes to the informational barriers that LFO fulfillment present to the franchise.  See 
Jason Weber, Equal Protection – Felon Disenfranchisement Scheme that Requires 
Completion of all Terms of Sentence Including Full Payment of Any Legal Financial 
Obligations is Constitutional Under Both Washington’s Privileges and Immunities 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 
1101, 1109 (2008). 
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unconstitutional.78  However, the doctrine of constitutional vagueness as cur-
rently constituted is inadequate and inapt for challenging most felon disenfran-
chisement statutes. 
The limited utility of constitutional vagueness is best demonstrated 
through the case of Thompson v. Alabama, which challenges what is likely the 
most confusing of the extant felon disenfranchisement statutes.79  Alabama, as 
it has since 1901, disenfranchises on the basis of crimes “involving moral tur-
pitude,” the contours of which remained elusive for decades.80  Until Thompson 
was filed, the State did not provide an authoritative definition of crimes involv-
ing “moral turpitude.”81  The newly provided definition was codified by statute, 
which enumerates a list of more than forty offenses that disenfranchise.82  Con-
sequently, the court determined that while the statute had many other deficien-
cies such that plaintiffs survived Alabama’s motion to dismiss on several 
claims, the claims alleging vagueness were properly dismissed.83 
Unconstitutional vagueness, while addressing one superficial facet of 
voter confusion, is too weak of a doctrine to address the entrenched and persis-
tent harm resulting from an overly complex and opaque statute.  The doctrine 
reflects what I, requiring prescription glasses from a young age, think of as the 
optometrist’s limitation. Like an eye test, unconstitutional vagueness doctrine 
helps only with clarity, not comprehensibility. The most an optometrist can 
help with is making letters clear; she cannot help provide meaning to nonsen-
sically ordered letters.  Unconstitutional vagueness doctrine is content with 
definitions, however intricate, and unconcerned with needless complexity or 
even the irrationality of statutory provisions.84 
  
 78. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2333 (2019). 
 79. Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1321 (M.D. Ala. 2017). 
 80. Hunter v. Underwood, 730 F.2d 614, 615–16 (11th Cir. 1984); Thompson 293 
F. Supp. 3d at 1316.  For the ugly history of Alabama’s statute, see Hunter, 730 F.2d at 
618–20.  The Hunter Court evocatively described the uncertainty engendered by the 
law as a “serpent . . . [that] crawl[s] into the Eden of trial administration.”  730 F.2d at 
616 n.2.  
 81. Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1318. 
 82. Id. at 1318–19. 
 83. Id. at 1328. 
 84. The modest application of unconstitutional vagueness doctrine means that 
some of the policy goals underlying the doctrine cannot be satisfied.  One of the reasons 
for the doctrine is that “regulated parties should know what is required of them so they 
may act accordingly.”  F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 
(2012).  Excruciatingly detailed but obscure statutes like the one implemented in Ala-
bama in response to Thompson do not help affected voters know how to comply with 
them.  Moreover, the breadth of disqualifying offenses and the uncertainty over whether 
intent is a necessary component of illegal voting does not provide “precision and guid-
ance” to “those enforcing the law,” or prevent them from acting in “an arbitrary or 
discriminatory” manner.  Id. 
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C.  Inform 
Where doctrine fails to produce satisfying solutions, policy may provide 
the answer.  States can do more to affirmatively inform eligible voters of their 
rights.  Especially given the temporal nature of disenfranchisement, many in-
dividuals may not be aware of when their rights reattach relative to their pro-
gression through the criminal legal system.  A few innovator states have started 
to take notification of rights restoration seriously, and others would do well to 
follow suit.  For instance, in 2005, Iowa individually notified residents whose 
rights were restored, although this policy was revoked in 2011 despite having 
had an appreciable positive impact on participation.85  Other states, like New 
Mexico, New York, and North Carolina also have notification laws.  However, 
they are much weaker and hence have had little impact.86  In Virginia, the law 
of unintended consequences triumphed to produce a policy of individualized 
notification of rights restoration.  Following the Virginia Supreme Court strik-
ing down the Governor’s criteria-based order of voting rights restoration, the 
Governor’s office began issuing restoration individually and sending individu-
alized notices of rights restoration.87 
It is not hard to see why individualized notification can have a huge im-
pact.  In states that have complex felon disenfranchisement statutes with dura-
tional bars on voting or that differentiate between crimes committed, individu-
alized notification can be especially invaluable in dispelling any risk aversion 
to voting created by confusing statutes.  Moreover, notification from the State, 
as opposed to civic organizations, conveys a legal certainty that is hard to rival.  
The State is also a more powerful messenger for the social desirability of vot-
ing.   
CONCLUSION 
The interaction of first-and second-generation features in felon disenfran-
chisement produces unique doctrinal and policy challenges for addressing the 
harms exacted on voter confidence and participation.  In particular, felon dis-
enfranchisement’s similarity to second-generation voter suppression laws pre-
sents unique challenges to voters attempting to navigate complex disenfran-
chising and re-enfranchising laws that differ greatly across the fifty states.  
Given the heavy informational and cognitive challenges that affected voters 
  
 85. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of Restoration of Ex-Felon Vot-
ing Rights: The Case of Iowa, 10 Q. J. POL. SCI 41, 44 (2015). 
 86. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Do Voting Rights Notification Laws In-
crease Ex-Felon Turnout?, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 220, 228–33 
(2014). 
 87. Vann R. Newkirk II, How Letting Felons Vote is Changing Virginia, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/vir-
ginia-clemency-restoration-of-rights-campaigns/549830/ [perma.cc/XJ28-XQ5E]. 
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 4 [], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss4/7
2019] FELON CONFUSION 1053 
face, policy-makers and reformers must do more to ensure that felon disenfran-
chisement laws are not only less harsh but also less confusing. 
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